Difference between revisions of "Team:Calgary/Safety"

 
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<h2>Engineering System Controls </h2>
 
<h2>Engineering System Controls </h2>
<p> We have designed the system to be <b>fail safe</b>, which means that the system's design prevents or mitigates unsafe consequences of the system's failure. That is, if and when a "fail-safe" system "fails", it is "safe" or at least no less safe than when it was operating correctly. Because our system can operate in batch and continuous modes, it is possible to retain the matter inside different storage tanks throughout the process, thus allowing for longer retention while a specific component of the system is getting fixed. </p>
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<p> We have designed the system to be <i>fail safe</i>, which means that the system's design prevents or mitigates unsafe consequences of the system's failure. That is, if and when a "fail-safe" system "fails", it is "safe" or at least no less safe than when it was operating correctly. Because our system can operate in batch and continuous modes, it is possible to retain the matter inside different storage tanks throughout the process, thus allowing for longer retention should a specific component of the system may need to be repaired. </p>
<p> We have also followed the <a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Inherent_safety">inherent safety</a> guidelines when designing our project, meaning that the process has a low level of danger, even when things go wrong. Our design <i> minimizes</i> the amount of hazardous material and completely removes (<i>substitute principle</i>) chloroform (solvent generally used for PHB extraction) from the design process.  We have also removed the toxic sludge from the main liquid stream early on in the process design, thus diluting and lowering the toxic concentrations (<i>moderate principle</i>).
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 +
<p> We have also followed the inherent safety guidelines when designing our project, meaning that the process has a low level of danger, even when things go wrong. Our design minimizes the amount of hazardous material and completely removes (<i>substitute principle</i>) chloroform (solvent generally used for PHB extraction) from the process.  We have also removed and sterilized toxic sludge from the main liquid stream early on in the process design (<i>moderate principle</i>).
 
</p>
 
</p>
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 +
<br>
  
 
<h2>Applied design safety: Mars</h2>
 
<h2>Applied design safety: Mars</h2>
<p>During our interviews with <b>Robert Thirsk</b> we were informed that point of failure identification and accessibility are crucial on the ISS. Therefore, we designed our process arrangement in such a  way to  allow astronaut easy and safe access to the failed component. </p>
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<p>During our interview with Chancellor Dr. Robert Thirsk, we learned that the identification and accessibility of possible points of failure are crucial on the International Space Station. Therefore, our goal was to design our process in such a way to allow astronauts easy and safe access to all components that might fail. </p>
<p><u>Identified </u> most likely points of failure:</p>
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<p>We have identified the most likely points of failure:</p>
 
<ul>
 
<ul>
<li> The filter after the centrifugal separator clogging</li>
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<li> The filter clogging after centrifugal separation of liquids and solids</li>
<li> Bioreactor contaminated with dead bacterial cells </li>
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<li> The self-cleaning filter of the stirred-tank bioreactor clogging</li>
<li> Self-cleaning filter clogging</li>
+
 
</ul>  
 
</ul>  
<p><u> Special arrangement of the equipment: </u></p>
 
<p>*insert a graphic of how all the equipment pieces fall together* </p>
 
<p></P>
 
<p>Another important safety consideration factor mentioned by many of the consulted experts (made in Space, Robert Thirsk, Pascal Lee) is the volatility of the produced plastic, or in the other words - off gassing.  (need to talk about the volatility of PHB) </p>
 
  
<h2> Biohazard considerations for ISS and Mars</h2>
+
<p>Another important safety factor was mentioned by many of the consulted experts, including Dr. Derek Thomas from Made in Space, Chancellor Dr.Robert Thirsk, and Dr. Pascal Lee of the NASA Ames Research Center. They suggested we consider the volatility of the produced plastic, also known as off-gassing. This parameter is important due to the Martian habitat being a closed system, where any off-gassing has high chances of entering the human body through air pathways. Our team didn't find any concerns with the PHB volatility, but further research is required  (such as conducting of off-gassing measurements) shall the project be developed further.</p>
  
<p> NASA is adapting the same biosafety hazard levels as the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the USA. The biohazard level 1 and 2 materials are allowed on the ISS, while levels 3 and 4 are generally prohibited, yet case-by-case consideration sometimes results in levels 3,4 being permitted as well. (<i>Biosafety review board operations and requirements document</i>, 2017). Our team assumes the same guidelines for the Martian Colonies.</p>
+
<br>
  
<p>From our interview with <b>Chris Hadfield</b> we learned that astronaut safety is one of the most important considerations to be made when anything for use in space is designed. Biosafety level 1 (BSL-1) is suitable for work with well-characterized agents which do not cause disease in healthy humans. In general, these agents should pose minimal potential hazard to laboratory personnel and the environment (<i>Biosafety review board operations and requirements document</i>, 2017). The strain that has been genetically engineered for PHB production and secretion,<i>E.coli</i> BL21(DE3), falls under the BSL-1 description and hence can be confidently assumed to be safe for ISS and Mars and to pose a very minimal health risk to astronauts.  
+
<h2> Biohazard considerations for the ISS and Mars</h2>
 +
 
 +
<p> NASA is adapting the same biosafety hazard levels as the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the USA. Biohazard Level 1 and 2 materials are allowed on the ISS, while Levels 3 and 4 are generally prohibited, although some may be permitted on a case-by-case basis (Biosafety review board operations and requirements document, 2017). Our team assumes the same guidelines for Martian colonization.</p>
 +
 
 +
<p>From our interview with Col. Chris Hadfield, we learned that astronauts' safety is one of the most important considerations. Biosafety Level 1 (BSL-1) is suitable for work with well-characterized agents which do not cause disease in healthy humans. In general, these agents pose a minimal potential hazard to laboratory personnel and the environment (Biosafety review board operations and requirements document, 2017). The strain that has been genetically engineered for PHB production and secretion,<i>E.coli</i> BL21(DE3), falls under the BSL-1 description. It is non-pathogenic, and hence can be confidently assumed to be safe for ISS and Mars and to pose a very minimal health risk to astronauts.
 
</p>
 
</p>
  
<p>Besides physical biocontainment of our engineered <i>E. coli</i> inside the fermenters and storage tanks, genetic biocontainment was also considered in case the bacteria were ever able to escape confinement. Genetic biocontainment is the genetic modification of an organism to prevent its survival outside of a controlled system. A simple form of genetic biocontainment is <b>auxotrophy</b>. For example, deleting or mutating genes for Methionine (an essential amino acid in protein biosynthesis) means that the bacteria would rely on a source of Methionine (Met) to survive. The designed fermenters/storage tanks would be filled with media that is supplemented with Met and the auxotrophic bacteria would be able to survive. But, if the bacteria were able to escape from our system, their source of Met would be lost and the bacteria would not survive. Due to the time constraints of the project, auxotrophy was not able to be implemented into our strain of <i>E.coli</i>, however it is a possibility for future work.</p>
+
<p>Besides physical biocontainment of our engineered <i>E. coli</i>, genetic biocontainment was also considered in case the bacteria were ever able to escape confinement. Genetic biocontainment is the genetic modification of an organism to prevent its survival outside of a controlled system. A simple form of genetic biocontainment is <b>auxotrophy</b>, and this principle was introduced to us by Dr. Sui-Lam Wong. Auxotrophy is defined as the inability of an organism to synthesize an essential nutrient, and so it must be provided with said nutrient in its growth medium to ensure survival. For example, deleting or mutating genes for methionine (an essential amino acid in protein biosynthesis) would force the bacteria to rely on a source of methionine survive. This amino acid could be added to the media in the fermenters and storage tanks for PHB-producing bacterial survival. However, if the bacteria were able to escape from our system, their source of methionine would be lost and the bacteria would not survive. Due to the time constraints of the project, auxotrophy was not able to be implemented into our strain of <i>E.coli</i>, however, it is a possibility for future work.</p>
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 +
<br>
  
 
<h2>Lab Safety</h2>
 
<h2>Lab Safety</h2>
  
<p>We have received safety training seminars in <b>WHMIS 2015</b>, <b>Spill Response Training</b>, <b>Hazard Assessment</b>, <b>Biohazard Handling</b>, <b>Occupational Health and Safety</b>, <b>Incident Reporting and Investigation</b>, and <b>Laboratory Safety</b>.</p>
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<p>We have received safety training seminars in <b>WHMIS 2015</b>, <b>Spill Response Training</b>, <b>Hazard Assessment</b>, <b>Biohazard Handling</b>, <b>Occupational Health and Safety</b>, <b>Incident Reporting and Investigation</b>, and <b>Laboratory Safety</b> from Environmental Health Services at the University of Calgary.</p>
  
 
<p>We have learned about the following topics in our safety training: <p>
 
<p>We have learned about the following topics in our safety training: <p>
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<p>
 
<p>
 
<ul style="padding-left: 2rem">
 
<ul style="padding-left: 2rem">
<li>Lab access and rules (including appropriate clothing, eating and drinking, etc.)</li>
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<li>Lab access and rules (including appropriate clothing, prohibition of eating and drinking, etc.)</li>
<li>Responsible individuals (lab or departmental specialist or institutional biosafety officer)</li>
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<li>Responsible individuals (lab or departmental specialists or institutional biosafety officers)</li>
<li>Differences between biosafety levels</li>
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<li>Differences between Biosafety Levels</li>
<li>Biosafety equipment (such as biosafety cabinets)</li>
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<li>Biosafety equipment (such as biosafety cabinets, gloves, laboratory coats, etc.)</li>
<li>Good microbial technique</li>
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<li>Proper aseptic technique</li>
 
  <li>Disinfection and sterilization</li>
 
  <li>Disinfection and sterilization</li>
 
  <li>Emergency procedures</li>
 
  <li>Emergency procedures</li>
 
  <li>Transport rules</li>
 
  <li>Transport rules</li>
 
  <li>Chemicals, fire and electrical safety</li>
 
  <li>Chemicals, fire and electrical safety</li>
 +
<li>Emergency and First Aid equipment (fire extinguisher, flashlight, eye washing station, shower, phone, etc.)</li>
 +
<li>Spill response kit</li>
 +
<li>The importance of washing hands upon entering and leaving the laboratory</li>
 
</ul>
 
</ul>
 
</p>
 
</p>
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   <img src="https://static.igem.org/mediawiki/2017/8/8e/Calgary2017_LabSafetyPicture1.jpg"><img src="https://static.igem.org/mediawiki/2017/d/de/Calgary2017_LabSafetyPicture2.jpg"><img src="https://static.igem.org/mediawiki/2017/8/81/Calgary2017_LabSafetyPicture3.jpg"></div>
 
   <img src="https://static.igem.org/mediawiki/2017/8/8e/Calgary2017_LabSafetyPicture1.jpg"><img src="https://static.igem.org/mediawiki/2017/d/de/Calgary2017_LabSafetyPicture2.jpg"><img src="https://static.igem.org/mediawiki/2017/8/81/Calgary2017_LabSafetyPicture3.jpg"></div>
  
<div id="Caption">The above pictures show some of the safety devices used in our lab. These include but are not limited to a safety shower, eyewash station, first aid kit, and biosafety cabinet.</div>
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<div id="Caption">Figures 1, 2, and 3. The above pictures show some of the safety devices used in our lab. These include but are not limited to a safety shower, eyewash station, first aid kit, and biosafety cabinet.</div>
<p> Due to the safety concerns of handling human fecal matter, synthetic feces (or "syn poo") that mimics the chemical properties of real feces were used during our experiments. The recipe for syn poo can be found <a href="https://2017.igem.org/Team:Calgary/Experiments">here.</a></p>
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<p> Due to the safety concerns of handling human fecal matter, we used synthetic feces, or "Syn Poo", in its place. Syn Poo mimics the chemical properties and composition of real feces. The recipe for Syn Poo can be found <a href="https://2017.igem.org/Team:Calgary/Experiments">here</a>.</p>
  
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<br>
  
 
</html>
 
</html>

Latest revision as of 03:52, 16 December 2017

Header

Safety

Engineering System Controls

We have designed the system to be fail safe, which means that the system's design prevents or mitigates unsafe consequences of the system's failure. That is, if and when a "fail-safe" system "fails", it is "safe" or at least no less safe than when it was operating correctly. Because our system can operate in batch and continuous modes, it is possible to retain the matter inside different storage tanks throughout the process, thus allowing for longer retention should a specific component of the system may need to be repaired.

We have also followed the inherent safety guidelines when designing our project, meaning that the process has a low level of danger, even when things go wrong. Our design minimizes the amount of hazardous material and completely removes (substitute principle) chloroform (solvent generally used for PHB extraction) from the process. We have also removed and sterilized toxic sludge from the main liquid stream early on in the process design (moderate principle).


Applied design safety: Mars

During our interview with Chancellor Dr. Robert Thirsk, we learned that the identification and accessibility of possible points of failure are crucial on the International Space Station. Therefore, our goal was to design our process in such a way to allow astronauts easy and safe access to all components that might fail.

We have identified the most likely points of failure:

  • The filter clogging after centrifugal separation of liquids and solids
  • The self-cleaning filter of the stirred-tank bioreactor clogging

Another important safety factor was mentioned by many of the consulted experts, including Dr. Derek Thomas from Made in Space, Chancellor Dr.Robert Thirsk, and Dr. Pascal Lee of the NASA Ames Research Center. They suggested we consider the volatility of the produced plastic, also known as off-gassing. This parameter is important due to the Martian habitat being a closed system, where any off-gassing has high chances of entering the human body through air pathways. Our team didn't find any concerns with the PHB volatility, but further research is required (such as conducting of off-gassing measurements) shall the project be developed further.


Biohazard considerations for the ISS and Mars

NASA is adapting the same biosafety hazard levels as the Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) in the USA. Biohazard Level 1 and 2 materials are allowed on the ISS, while Levels 3 and 4 are generally prohibited, although some may be permitted on a case-by-case basis (Biosafety review board operations and requirements document, 2017). Our team assumes the same guidelines for Martian colonization.

From our interview with Col. Chris Hadfield, we learned that astronauts' safety is one of the most important considerations. Biosafety Level 1 (BSL-1) is suitable for work with well-characterized agents which do not cause disease in healthy humans. In general, these agents pose a minimal potential hazard to laboratory personnel and the environment (Biosafety review board operations and requirements document, 2017). The strain that has been genetically engineered for PHB production and secretion,E.coli BL21(DE3), falls under the BSL-1 description. It is non-pathogenic, and hence can be confidently assumed to be safe for ISS and Mars and to pose a very minimal health risk to astronauts.

Besides physical biocontainment of our engineered E. coli, genetic biocontainment was also considered in case the bacteria were ever able to escape confinement. Genetic biocontainment is the genetic modification of an organism to prevent its survival outside of a controlled system. A simple form of genetic biocontainment is auxotrophy, and this principle was introduced to us by Dr. Sui-Lam Wong. Auxotrophy is defined as the inability of an organism to synthesize an essential nutrient, and so it must be provided with said nutrient in its growth medium to ensure survival. For example, deleting or mutating genes for methionine (an essential amino acid in protein biosynthesis) would force the bacteria to rely on a source of methionine survive. This amino acid could be added to the media in the fermenters and storage tanks for PHB-producing bacterial survival. However, if the bacteria were able to escape from our system, their source of methionine would be lost and the bacteria would not survive. Due to the time constraints of the project, auxotrophy was not able to be implemented into our strain of E.coli, however, it is a possibility for future work.


Lab Safety

We have received safety training seminars in WHMIS 2015, Spill Response Training, Hazard Assessment, Biohazard Handling, Occupational Health and Safety, Incident Reporting and Investigation, and Laboratory Safety from Environmental Health Services at the University of Calgary.

We have learned about the following topics in our safety training:

  • Lab access and rules (including appropriate clothing, prohibition of eating and drinking, etc.)
  • Responsible individuals (lab or departmental specialists or institutional biosafety officers)
  • Differences between Biosafety Levels
  • Biosafety equipment (such as biosafety cabinets, gloves, laboratory coats, etc.)
  • Proper aseptic technique
  • Disinfection and sterilization
  • Emergency procedures
  • Transport rules
  • Chemicals, fire and electrical safety
  • Emergency and First Aid equipment (fire extinguisher, flashlight, eye washing station, shower, phone, etc.)
  • Spill response kit
  • The importance of washing hands upon entering and leaving the laboratory

Figures 1, 2, and 3. The above pictures show some of the safety devices used in our lab. These include but are not limited to a safety shower, eyewash station, first aid kit, and biosafety cabinet.

Due to the safety concerns of handling human fecal matter, we used synthetic feces, or "Syn Poo", in its place. Syn Poo mimics the chemical properties and composition of real feces. The recipe for Syn Poo can be found here.


Works Cited

Biosafety review board operations and requirements document, 2017, Biosafety Review Board, Environmental Factors Branch, Habitability and Environmental Factors Division