Difference between revisions of "Team:Michigan/Silver"

Team Michigan: Human Practices - Silver

Our team wanted to design a safety mechanism that could be utilized in modified organisms to minimize unintended consequences.The consequences of engineered organisms include both the ecological impacts and the effects on public perception of the organism and synthetic biology. We considered the relationship between safety and public impressions during our public engagement and education. Our human practices efforts focused on how we could create a genetically encoded containment mechanism that improved the safety of synthetic biology designs while initiating a dialogue with community members. As we began thinking about a safety project, our research into containment mechanisms for engineered microorganisms led us to consider genetic kill switches because of their flexibility and ease of use compared to other containment methods. These kill switches are within the modified microbe and are designed to kill it outside of a defined place, time, or function. Parallel genetically encoded containment mechanisms not only offer the chance for flexibility but also reduce the risk of escape below the acceptable level of 1 escapee per 10^8. That knowledge informed our design for a temperature dependent kill switch as a new type of containment mechanism that can be used as an additional layer of control in combination with other kill switches. Concerned about how the public views genetically modified organisms, we created a panel discussion to create a dialogue with experts and the public. That led us to consider how kill switches might be viewed by members of the public. While a kill switch that meets acceptable guidelines may be attractive to scientists and regulatory bodies, it might not be understood or favored by the general public. We developed a series of initiatives to increase awareness of synthetic biology in our own community and make our research more accessible to interested people who are not involved in research labs. . We transitioned to thinking about a framework for genetically encoded kill switches. Many iGEM teams use such safety mechanisms, but careful characterization needs to be done for each kill switch. In addition, a standardized risk assessment, such as the one suggested by a review on genetic containment mechanisms (Moe-Behrens et al. 2013 https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3554958/) might improve the way kill switches are implemented. When iGEM teams, research groups, or biotechnology efforts adopt a kill switch, it often leads to a sense of security that may not be warranted. While well intentioned, these kill switches are often developed without public input, and do not take into consideration valid concerns about the use of engineered microbes. We propose a framework to help iGEM teams consider adopting a kill switch or multiple containment mechanisms. (link to document that illustrates this point)